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Introduction
Household consumption analysis takes a prominent position in the microeconomics literature. In settings with multiple household members, theoretical consumption models often assume transferable utility. As we will explain below, this assumption considerably simplifies the analysis. This paper provides a framework for bringing the (theoretically appealing) transferable utility hypothesis to empirical data. Specifically, we define the testable implications of transferable utility in revealed preference terms.
The transferable utility hypothesis is popular in household economics. It underlies important theoretical results in the modeling of household behavior. Probably the best known example here is Becker's (1974) rotten kid theorem; see Bergstrom (1989) for 2. Testable implications of transferable utility
Generalized quasilinearity
To define the testable implications of transferable utility at the household level, we need to characterize the underlying utility functions of the individuals within the household. The best known specification leading to the property of transferable utility is the quasilinear (QL) utility specification. This specification requires the utility functions of the individuals to be linear in at least one good, usually called the numeraire. Unfortunately, QL utility has strong and unrealistic implications (e.g., absence of income effects for all but a single good, risk neutrality, etc.).
In the presence of public goods, Cornes (1981, 1983) and Bergstrom (1989) showed that a weaker form than QL utility equally implies transferable utility, i.e., generalized quasilinear utility (a term coined by Chiappori 2010) . 2 Interestingly, these authors also showed that this GQL specification provides a necessary and sufficient condition for transferable utility under Pareto efficient household behavior. The GQL form can be obtained from the QL specification through multiplication of the numeraire by a function defined in terms of the bundle of (intrahousehold) public goods. The additional requirement that this function is common to all individuals within the household provides the property of transferable utility. As households typically consume a large amount of public goods, this characterization of transferable utility is particularly convenient in household settings.
Recently, Chiappori (2010) derived a set of necessary and sufficient conditions on the (aggregate) household demand function such that it is compatible with a Pareto efficient allocation where household members are endowed with GQL utility functions. As far as we know, this is the first (and-until now-sole) study that makes the testable implications of transferable utility explicit. In view of our following exposition, we note that Chiappori adopted a so-called differential approach to characterizing GQL utility: he focused on testable (differential) properties of the household demand function to be consistent with transferable utility. Practical applications of this differential approach then typically require a prior parametric specification of this demand function, which is to be estimated from the data. As we will indicate below, this implies a most notable difference with the approach that we follow here.
Revealed preference implications
We complement Chiappori's findings by establishing testable conditions of transferable utility (or GQL utility) in the revealed preference tradition of Samuelson (1938) , seminal contribution on the aggregation of indirect utility functions defined over private goods, hereby introducing the notion of what is currently known as Gorman polar form preferences. Bergstrom and Varian (1985) applied Gorman's analysis to the case of transferable utility in markets with private goods. Cornes (1981, 1983) and Bergstrom (1989) used duality theory to extend Gorman's aggregation theorem to the case of transferable utility with public goods. Recently, Cherchye et al. (2012) established a revealed preference characterization of Gorman's original aggregation conditions for private goods (including Gorman polar form preferences). Given the above, this last characterization can thus be seen as complementary ("dual") to the revealed preference characterization of transferable utility that we develop here. Houthakker (1950) , Afriat (1967) , Diewert (1973), and Varian (1982) . In contrast to the differential approach, this revealed preference approach obtains conditions that can be verified by (only) using a finite set of household consumption observations (i.e., prices and quantities) and, thus, it does not require the estimation of a household demand function. As such, a main advantage of these revealed preference conditions is that they allow a nonparametric analysis of the data: they do not impose any functional form on the utility function (generating a particular household demand function) except for usual regularity conditions.
More specifically, we get necessary and sufficient conditions that enable checking consistency of a given data set with transferable utility. In the spirit of Varian (1982) , we refer to this as "testing" data consistency with transferable utility. As for the practical application of this test, we also show that our revealed preference conditions can be equivalently reformulated as integer programming constraints. This integer programming formulation allows us to test data consistency with transferable utility by applying standard integer programming solution techniques.
Remarks
At this point, it is worth indicating one further important difference between our study and the original study of Chiappori (2010) . To establish his characterization, Chiappori assumed observability of the numeraire good. However, in practice this numeraire good is typically an "outside" good, i.e., the amount of money not spent on observed consumption, which is usually not recorded in real-life applications. Given this, our following revealed preference analysis will principally focus on characterizing transferable utility for the case with an unobserved numeraire (or outside good). To obtain this characterization, we will first have to establish the characterization that applies to an observed numeraire.
As a final remark, we indicate that Brown and Calsamiglia (2007) developed a revealed preference characterization of the QL utility specification. By focusing on the GQL utility form, we provide revealed preference conditions for a model that contains this QL specification as a special case.
Generalized quasilinear utility
Consider a household with M (≥ 2) members. Each member m (≤ M) consumes a bundle of N + 1 private goods (q m x m ) ∈ R N+1 + and a bundle of K public goods Q ∈ R K + . The private good x m denotes member m's amount of the numeraire. For each m, we assume x m > 0 in what follows. 3 In addition, we normalize by setting the price of the numeraire equal to 1. Next, the vector p ∈ R N ++ represents the normalized price vector for the bundle of private goods q m , while the vector P ∈ R K ++ is the normalized price vector for the bundle of public goods Q.
The utility of member m is represented by the strictly increasing and quasiconcave utility function u m (q m x m Q). The utility functions u m are said to be of the GQL form if there exist a (member-specific) function b m : R K+N + → R and a (common) function a : Bergstrom and Cornes (1983) have shown that member-specific GQL utilities are necessary and sufficient for transferable utility under Pareto efficient household behavior. 4 The GQL specification encompasses the QL specification as a special case. Specifically, if a(Q) = a for all Q (i.e., the function value a(Q) is everywhere the same), then the specification in (1) coincides with the QL specification:
However, if a(Q) varies with the level of public goods, then the GQL specification vastly expands the range of utility functions compatible with transferable utility.
We assume that household decisions are made according to the Pareto criterion: allocations are chosen such that no member can be made better off without reducing the utility of some other household member. 5 In this case, any equilibrium allocation (q 1 q M x 1 x M Q) minimizes total household expenditures subject to the constraint that every member of the household receives at least some predefined level of utilityū m . In other words, given a fixed vector of utility levels (ū 1 ū M ) ∈ R M + , Pareto efficiency imposes that the household decision making process solves the optimization problem
In view of our following analysis, we develop an equivalent formulation of (OP.1). 6 To obtain the formulation, we first observe that each constraint will be binding in the solution of (OP.1) because the utility functions u m are strictly increasing. Using this, and because x m > 0 for all m, we can substitute the restrictions in the objective function. As a 4 See also Browning et al. (2014, p. 276 ) for a detailed discussion of this functional specification. 5 See Chiappori (1988) and Cherchye et al. (2007 Cherchye et al. ( , 2009 Cherchye et al. ( , 2011a for revealed preference tests of the assumption of Pareto optimality without the additional assumption of transferable utility. As is clear from the restrictions in optimization problem (OP.1), transferable utility imposes a specific structure on individual utilities on top of Pareto efficiency. This extra structure plays a crucial role for our subsequent revealed preference characterization, which is substantially different (i.e., more restrictive) from the characterization of Pareto efficiency in the above-mentioned references. 6 It can be shown that the functions a and b m in (OP.1) are in general not concave. This makes it difficult to derive a revealed preference characterization of transferable utility directly from (OP.1). By contrast, as we explain below, the functions α and β m in (OP.2) are convex and concave, respectively, and these properties will be crucial to obtain our revealed preference characterizations in Propositions 1 and 2.
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From this equivalent formulation, it is directly clear that the optimal solution of problem (OP.1) only depends on the total amount of utility M mū m , but not on the specific distribution of this amount over the different household members. This demonstrates the property of transferable utility under GQL.
Standard first order conditions characterize the (interior) solutions of problem (OP.2) if the function α is convex and the functions β m are concave. Bergstrom and Cornes (1983) showed that these requirements are equivalent to the condition that the utility functions u m are quasiconcave (which we assumed before). Next, it is easy to verify that α is decreasing in Q while the β m are increasing in q. If we further assume that b m and a are bounded from below and a is strictly positive, then β m is also increasing in Q. 7 For an optimal solution (q 1 * q M * x 1 * x M * Q * ) of problem (OP.2), the first order conditions are 8
Conditions (foc.1) and (foc.2) provide a formal expression of the household's marginal decision rules for the public and private goods, respectively. Next, condition (foc.3) complies with the GQL utility specification in (1). The first order conditions (foc.1)-(foc.3) provide a useful starting point for developing our revealed preference characterization in the next section.
Revealed preference characterization
We analyze the (aggregate) consumption behavior of a household with M individuals, by starting from a finite set T of observed household choices. For each observation t ∈ T , we know the privately and publicly consumed quantities q t and Q t , as well as the corresponding prices p t and P t . Note that we only observe the aggregate private quantities q t and not the member-specific quantities q m t . In a first instance, we assume that the 7 We can show this by contradiction. Assume that β m is nonincreasing in Q at some bundle. Then, concavity of β m implies that β m is unbounded from below. However, as a is strictly positive for all Q, this means that b m must be unbounded from below, which gives the wanted contradiction. We thank Phil Reny for pointing this out to us. 8 If α or β is not differentiable, we may take the sub-and superdifferentials that satisfy the corresponding first order conditions. The same applies to the proof of Proposition 1.
Theoretical Economics 10 (2015) Is utility transferable? 57 aggregate amount of the numeraire (outside) good at every t (i.e., x t ) is also observed (again we assume that the member-specific quantities x m t are not observed). We will relax this assumption later on. As discussed before, we believe an unobserved numeraire is a more realistic assumption for real-life applications.
Numeraire observed
If the consumption of the numeraire is observed, then the relevant data set is S = {p t P t ; x t q t Q t } t∈T . In what follows, we present necessary and sufficient conditions for the set S to be rationalizable in terms of GQL utility functions, i.e., there exist functions α and β m so that each bundle (x t q t Q t ) (t ∈ T ) leads to a solution for (OP.2). This provides a characterization of transferable utility in the revealed preference tradition. Our starting definition is the following.
Definition 1 (TU-rationalizability). The data set S = {p t P t ; x t q t Q t } t∈T is transferable utility rationalizable (TU-rationalizable) if (i) there exist a convex and decreasing function α : R K + → R, and M concave and increasing functions β m : R N+K + → R N , and (ii) for each t, there exist private consumption bundles q 1 t q M t that sum to q t and strictly positive numbers x 1 t x M t that sum to x t such that {q 1 t q M t Q t } solves (OP.2) given the prices p t and P t , and utility levelsū m t =
Of course, the above definition could equally well have been stated by using the functions a and b m , and by referring to program (OP.1). We opt for the current statement to enhance the interpretation of the revealed preference characterization below.
It follows from Definition 1 that the concept of TU-rationalizability implicitly depends on the number of individuals within the household. However, as the following result shows, this qualification is actually irrelevant in view of practical applications: it is empirically impossible to distinguish between different household sizes; there exists a rationalization of the set S in terms of a single individual (i.e., M = 1) if and only if there exists one in terms of any number of individuals. More specifically, we can prove the following result. 9 Proposition 1. Consider a data set S = {p t P t ; x t q t Q t } t∈T . The following statements are equivalent: (i) The data set S is TU-rationalizable for a household of M individuals.
(ii) The data set S is TU-rationalizable for a household of a single individual.
The equivalence between statements (i) and (ii) demonstrates the aggregation property of the transferable utility assumption that we mentioned above: if a data set is TUrationalizable for a household of M individuals, then it is rationalizable for a single individual (endowed with a GQL utility function) and vice versa. 10 Statement (iii) then provides the combinatorial conditions that characterize the collection of data sets that are TU-rationalizable. The first two conditions ((RP.1) and (RP.2)) define so-called Afriat inequalities that apply to our specific setting. In terms of Definition 1, these inequalities correspond to, respectively, the (convex) function α and the (concave) function β (where we drop the index m because of the equivalence between statements (i) and (ii)). The vectors λ α t and λ β t then represent the gradient vectors of these functions in terms of the public goods bundle. Finally, the conditions (RP.3) and (RP.4) give the revealed preference counterparts of the first order conditions (foc.1) and (foc.3) that we discussed in the previous section.
Numeraire unobserved
In real-life applications the amount of the numeraire good is usually not observed. For example, this will also be the case in our own application. The relevant data set is then given as S = {p t P t ; q t Q t } t∈T .
Interestingly, the result in Proposition 1 enables us to establish a characterization of transferable utility for such a data set S. Specifically, we can derive the following result.
Proposition 2. Consider a data set S = {p t P t ; q t Q t } t∈T . The following statements are equivalent:
(i) For all t ∈ T , there exist x t ∈ R ++ such that {p t P t ; x t q t Q t } t∈T is TUrationalizable for a household of M individuals (or, equivalently, a single individual).
When compared to the characterization in Proposition 1, the conditions (RP.5), (RP.6), and (RP.7) in Proposition 2 correspond to (RP.1), (RP.2), and (RP.3), respectively. We refer to the proof of the result for an explicit construction. This proof also shows that for each observation t, we can always construct a numeraire quantity x t that meets condition (RP.4) if the data satisfy (RP.5)-(RP.7).
As we motivated before, we believe that the empirically interesting setting is the one where the quantity of the numeraire good is not observed. The conditions (RP.6) and (RP.7) in Proposition 2 are linear and therefore easily verifiable, while the Afriat inequalities in condition (RP.5) are quadratic (i.e., nonlinear in the unknown λ t 's and P A t 's). From a practical point of view, this nonlinearity makes it difficult to empirically verify the characterization in Proposition 2. However, in Appendix B, we show that these Afriat inequalities can be equivalently restated in terms of linear (mixed) binary integer programming constraints.
Nested models
To conclude this section, we discuss the relationship between the transferable utility conditions developed above and closely related rationalizability conditions that have been considered in the revealed preference literature. Specifically, we make explicit how the transferable utility model is situated "between" the QL utility model and the unitary model. This further clarifies the interpretation of our revealed preference characterization of transferable utility.
As a first exercise, we recall from the previous section that QL utility imposes that the function value α(Q) is constant for all Q. In terms of the characterization in Proposition 1, this means that the gradient vector λ α t equals 0. One can then easily verify that the conditions (RP.1)-(RP.4) reduce to
This condition is necessary and sufficient for data consistency with the QL utility specification. 11 We observe that the QL condition (RP.8) is independent of the level of the numeraire (x t ), which implies a notable difference with our above characterization of GQL utility. In fact, this independence is also revealed by the fact that the conditions (RP.5)-(RP.7) in Proposition 2 equally coincide with (RP.8) if we set P A t equal to zero for all t ∈ T (which has a similar meaning as λ α t = 0 in Proposition 1). Next, it directly follows from statement (ii) in Proposition 1 that the transferable utility model is nested in the unitary model. In fact, in Appendix C we show that conditions (RP.1)-(RP.4) automatically require that the data satisfy the generalized axiom of revealed preference (GARP), which is necessary and sufficient for data consistency with the unitary model (Varian 1982) . In other words, if a household data set is TU-rationalizable, then the household acts as a single individual. However, a household may well behave as if it were a single decision maker without satisfying transferable utility. In this sense, our revealed preference conditions in Propositions 1 and 2 capture the additional restrictions that observed consumption behavior must satisfy for the transferable utility assumption to hold. Our conditions effectively allow for bringing these specific restrictions of TU-rationalizability to empirical data.
In this respect, one further point relates to Proposition 2. This result makes clear that transferable utility has testable implications even if the numeraire good is not observed. 11 In fact, condition (RP.8) is equivalent to the revealed preference condition that Brown and Calsamiglia (2007) originally derived for data consistency with the QL specification. 60 Cherchye, Demuynck, and De Rock Theoretical Economics 10 (2015) By contrast, following a revealed preference approach similar to ours, Varian (1988) has shown that the unitary model does not have any testable implications as soon as we do not observe the consumption quantity of some good (in this case the numeraire quantity x t ). We believe this is an interesting observation, as it suggests that considering the transferable utility model may be empirically meaningful even if the unitary model is nontestable.
Conclusion
We have presented revealed preference conditions that must be satisfied by observed behavior to be consistent with transferable utility (or GQL utility) under Pareto efficiency. These conditions are easily verified by using integer programming techniques, which is attractive from a practical point of view. This provides an easy-to-apply framework for evaluating the empirical realism of the transferable utility hypothesis in observational settings. As a side result, our theoretical discussion also made clear how the transferable utility model is situated between the quasilinear and unitary models: its (revealed preference) testable implications are weaker than the QL implications but stronger than the unitary implications.
Appendix A: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1 (ii) → (iii). By convexity of the function α(Q) and concavity of the function β(q Q), we must have that for all observations t v ∈ T ,
For all t ∈ T , define α t = α(Q t ), β t = β(q t Q t ),ū t = u(x t q t Q t ), λ α t = ∂α(Q t ) ∂Q , and λ β t = ∂β(q t Q t ) ∂Q . Then substituting and using the first order conditions (foc.1)-(foc.3), we obtain conditions (RP.1)-(RP.4).
(i) → (iii). The proof is similar to the case (ii) → (iii) except now we define β t = m β m (q m t Q t ) and λ β t = ∂β(q m t Q t ) ∂Q . (iii) → (ii). Define the functions α(Q) and β(q Q) in the manner
. The function α is convex and β is concave, hence u is quasiconcave. Furthermore, it is increasing in both q and Q. Finally, using a similar argument as Varian (1982, p. 970) , we can derive that α(Q t ) = α t and β(q t Q t ) = β t for all t ∈ T .
The linear inequalities (IP.1) and (IP.2) are clearly identical to (RP.6) and (RP.7). Further, the nonlinear inequalities (RP.5) have been replaced by the linear inequalities (IP.3)-(IP.5) that make use of real and binary variables. More specifically, (IP.3)-(IP.5) correspond to the GARP condition in Definition 2.
To explain the inequalities (IP.3)-(IP.5), we interpret the variables r t v in terms of the revealed preference relation R, i.e., r t v = 1 corresponds to Q t R Q v . The constraint (IP.3) then imposes Q t R Q v (or r t v = 1) whenever P A t Q t ≥ P A t Q v . Next, the constraint (IP.4) complies with transitivity of the relation R: if Q t R Q v (r t v = 1) and Q v R Q s (r v s = 1), then Q t R Q s (r t s = 1). Finally, the constraint (IP.5) states that if Q v R Q t (r v t = 1), then we must have P A t Q t ≤ P A t Q v . For a given data set S, we can verify the above linear inequalities by using mixed integer linear programming techniques. It enables us to use solution algorithms that are specially tailored for such problems (see, for example, Nemhauser and Wolsey 1999) . Given the result in Proposition 3, this effectively checks whether the set S is consistent with transferable utility (i.e., rationalizable in terms of GQL utility functions).
Appendix C: Conditions (RP.1)-(RP.4) imply GARP Varian (1982) has shown that the data set S is consistent with the unitary model of household consumption if and only if it satisfies GARP (see Definition 2, where we replace Z by S). In what follows, we show that S satisfies GARP if it satisfies conditions (RP.1)-(RP.4) in Proposition 1.
From (RP.2) it follows that
Then, using (RP.4), we obtain
Next, addingū v (α v − α t ) to both sides and making use of (RP.1) gives
Finally, from (RP.3), we get
Now, the above inequality shows that if p v q v + P v Q v + x v ≥ p v q t + P v Q t + x t , then u v ≥ū t . Hence, if (q v Q v x v ) R (q t Q t x t ), then alsoū v ≥ū t . As such, if, on the contrary, GARP is not satisfied, there must exist observations t and v ∈ T such thatū v ≥ū t and u t >ū v , a contradiction.
